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LAWS OF AERIAL WARFARE

LAWS OF AERIAL WARFAREt
By ELBRIDGE COLBY*

S

IX.

CIvIL POPULATION AND AIRcRAwr

are decent persons after all. It is a question of accuracy rather than of intent. Whatever may be said of excited
belligerent governments or newspapers, the intent may be quite
proper and the fault be merely one of observation or of accuracy
in execution. And yet even here there are differences of opinion.
It has been said:
"Everything points to the conclusion that
Zeppelin navigators
were only enabled to pick up a general idea of locality by following the Thames, or some other river, and that as regards London
they had little idea as to which of its 200 square miles they were
directly over." 30
And it has likewise been said-by a German airplane commander
-that all the objects which they sought to hit were "absolutely
clear.''
Most of this bombing is done at night, frequently on the
darkest nights. 13 2 In spite of its tendency towards inaccuracy,
it is considered as important as day bombing.1 3 It is done from
planes flying anywhere from 90 to 115 miles per hour, 1 '3
and from an altitude of from 4,000 to 6,000 feet.13 5
Under such circumstances, a very high degree of accuracy cannot be expected, particularly when the pressure for
replacements and for rapidity in training has resulted-and may
in the future result-in sending out men not sufficiently experienced in dropping bombs. 36 "The object of a bomber," says a
Manual on the subject, "is to get the load of bombs over the target
and to discharge them in such a way that the maximum number
OLDIERS

of hits are registered. ' 1 3 7

Some are bound to be "misses" instead

of "hits" as any one who has handled a weapon on a target range
must know. And there will be other factors than the mere human
tContinued from 10 MINN FsorA LAW REVIEW 148.
*Captain of Infantry, Ft. Benning, Ga.
1506bid, p. 32.

I31Ibid., p. 158.

' 32 Aerial Bombardment Manual, U. S. Army (1920), Part 3, p. 25.
'33Ibid.,
(1920), Part 1, p. 3.
'233 5Training Regulations No. 15-70, U. S. Army (1922), par. 14, d, (1).
-Aerial Bombardment Manual, U. S. Army, (1920), Part 3, p. 30.
' 3 BIbid., (1920), Part 1, pp. 5-6.
1371bid., (1920), Part 1, p. 8.
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equation to make some of them miss their target. The aviator flies
at night to avoid observation and annoyance from hostile scouts
and pursuit planes. He is generally sent to points "deep in the
enemy's territory."'' Some times the town containing the military objectives of his flight, is revealed to him only by a river
line or some very distinct natural landmark of some other kind,
from which he must calculate his distances and estimate the location of his objective. 139 When he attacks in this fashion, innocent
people are bound to be struck. How can the man across the street
from the General Post Office in London be safe, when sixty yards
is laid down as the average striking distance from a thirty-foot
target which is attained only at an advanced stage of bombing
training?14° Because a tobacconist or a haberdasher has a little
shop over there, shall the enemies of England be compelled to
refrain from using their aerial power to strike at the center of
postal and telegraphic communications of the Empire? Such
aeadly accuracy as would be needed to demolish the government
building with one or more bombs and have none fall anywhere
else, is not human. It is not reasonable to expect such accuracy
under the conditions under which aviators have to work. No
belligerent could fairly be held to that, whatever war-time propaganclists or theoretical jurists may say. It would be "the 'pound
of flesh' which the air commander must take without drawing
civilian blood."1 " An American commentator on this point has
said:
"How, it may well be asked, can an aviator who flies over a
city at great height during the night, when all lights are extinguished, as was the general practice during the World War, identify the persons and things which he is permitted to bombard?
How can he distinguish between the military forces and the civil
population; between military works, depots and factories engaged
in the manufacture of arms and munitions or used for military
purposes, and other establishments engaged in the manufacture or
production of articles used for civil purposes, or between railway
lines used for military purposes and those which are not? To
require aviators to single out the one class of persons and things
from the other and to confine their attacks 'exclusively' to one of
cases amount to an absolute prohibition of all
them will in many
1 42

bombardment."'
13STraining Regulations No. 15-70, U. S. Army (1922), par. 15.
3'Manual of Anti-Aircraft Defense (British), 1922, p. 172, sec. 145.
140 Aerial Bombardment Manual, U. S. Army (1920), Part 4, p. 12.
141Spaight, Air Bombardment, in British Yearbook of International
Law, 1923-24, p. 30.
14-Garner, Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare, in
18 Am. J. Int. L. 69.
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The question is a question of accuracy and not a question of
intent. No belligerent should be required to forfeit the normal
percentage of hits which might be expected on his target, simply
because there will be a percentage of "misses." The percentage
of "hits" is a military weapon to the use of which he is entitled.
By it he may be able to win his war. It is not a question of an
intention to hit civilians instead of military depots, or of an intention to terrorize generally. Like the actuarian figuring expectant
mortality for a life insurance company, he cannot foretell what
will happen in any individual case,143 but he can tell what his
average will be. His intent is to place "the maximum number of
hits" on his target according to his average accuracy.
A single incident in American military aviation history will
illustrate the point, an incident deliberately chosen from time of
peace, in order to preclude all criticism as to partisanship and
unusual inefficiency on the part of the bombers. In the spring of
1923, the United States Air Service sent two airplanes to bomb
an ice gorge in the Delaware River, at the request of the local civil
authorities. The aviators must be presumed competent, for no
government would risk killing its own citizens in time of peace by
sending insufficiently trained bombers or pilots. The Army is
hedged about with too many legislative and judicial responsibilities for that. The ice gorge extended along a river-line--not too
hard to follow-for a distance of three miles. A total of seven
bombs were dropped from a height of 1,500 feet-far lower than
war conditions would usually permit. Only four bombs hit the
attenuated target. One of the three that missed, nearly hit a
farmhouse 300 feet from the river.214 Indeed, it is a question of
accuracy. In peace-time, from a comparatively low height, unharied by enemy guns or planes, with a long strip of a target, the
percentage of hits was 57 1/7. In war-time, the farm house might
very probably have been hit; the percentage of hits would almost
certainly have been lower.
Another post bellum instance of the employment of airplanes
is also interesting, not only as regards the question of accuracy
but also on another score. During British operations against
Afghans on the North West Frontier of India, the general officer
1431 am unable to subscribe to the "unusual degree of disgust and
hatred" felt by one writer toward an enemy for using such a method of
attack which "although aimed at a city containing troops, munition factories, and military depots, must inevitably fall almost entirely upon civilians." Turner, The Struggle in the Air 144.
14The New York Times, March 15, 1923, page 9b.
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commanding reported on May 17, 1919, that nearly twelve hundred weight of explosives had been dropped on Basawal, on the
ridge to the west of Dakka, and on Jalalabad ;14' and the Afghan
commander-in-chief declared that these British air bombs "inflicted heavy losses on the civil population and army of Afghanistan.' '1

4

It was announced that an air raid of May 21st, caused

"great confusion, and the town is practically deserted. Several
government buildings were set on- fire and citizens, Afghan officers, and the majority of the Afghan troops fled in panic.1 14 7

At this juncture the Amir Amanulla protested that "Jalalabad and
the Royal Palace at Kabul and the tombs of his forefathers were
bombed," and added: "It causes us great regret to see the example
of Germany followed by the British.'

14

Then explanations were

in order. The Viceroy informed the secretary of state for the
Colonies of the "facts" as follows:
"Kabul: Bombing was limited to the arsenal workshops and
the Ark or citadel, which is used, not for residential purposes, but
as a subterraneous magazine. The tomb of Abdur Rahman is in
grounds outside the Ark, and it is possible that the area of burst
of bombs might include it.... Jalalabad: our information shows

that Amir -iabibulla has been temporarily interred in a grave on
the golf course; no bombs have been dropped on any grave that
could be recognized from the air as such. The Palace was
bombed; it was being used as military headquarters. Damage was
undoubtedly done by bombing to the town about which troops
were billetted." 1"
In answer to the protest of the Amir, the British commander
said: "My airplanes must continue to reconnoiter in order to
secure my troops. .

.

. If our airplanes are molested, they will

retaliate." Then the Amir countered as follows:
"The advent of your airplanes is certain to cause extraordinary excitement amongst our people, who will fire at them in spite
of our strict orders not to. The airplane will then bomb them." '
And he went on to plead for a complete cessation of aerial activ"ity as certain to lead to trouble and irregularities. But it is not
indicated that the British were willing to forego the many advantages which an efficient air force gave them over their less civilized enemies. Possibly their Flying Corps personnel had got into
bad habits during the successive "reprisals" on the Western Front.
British Parliamentary Papers, East India, 1919, p. 11.
14GIbid., p. 12.
147Ibid.,
p. 19.
148 Ibid., p. 25.
'49Ibid., p. 31.
'5 27 British Parliamentary Papers, East India, 1919, p. 32.
14537
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Possibly some of their higher commanders recalled that little sentence in official instructions to the effect that the rules of international law apply only to warfare between civilized states, and "do
not apply in wars w ith uncivilized states and tribes, where their
place is taken by the discretion of the commander and such rules
of justice and humanity as recommend themselves in the particular circumstances of the case."' 151 Possibly they had in mind some
such principle as that which was three years later put into words
by the general staff school of another nation:
"The effect of bombing is generally very great upon the morale of an irregular enemy. The objective of irregular operations
...may be the capital of the people, their main source of supply,
their prominent
leaders, or, if a fanatical people, the seat of their
152
religion.'
We cannot tell. The incident and the discussion is simply related
for what it is worth, as indicative of the manner in which practice
has continued.
X.

WARS AND NON-COMBATANTS

We might conclude, after this examination of the events since
1914 and of the opinions and purposes of military men who
carry combat into the air and wage it from the air, that the private
citizen of the present seems less safe now than he has been for
many hundreds of years. War is changing, we hear it said, in
its intensiveness and in its physical and legal capacity to harm
the private citizen. It has different methods and different aims
we are told than it used to have. And it is not only of aerial war
that this is said, but of war in general. So, it may be profitable to
look into the general subject of war itself from a legal and political, as well as from a sheer military and aerial standpoint.
There is a popular idea to the contrary-to the effect that
with the passing of time and the adoption of international conventions war has become more and more humane. The world is
152 Manual of Military Law (British), 1914, p. 235, par. 7. In 1815
James Monroe declared it perfectly proper for General Harrison to have
burned Indian huts and cabins in 1813, saying: "This species of warfare
has been pursued by every nation engaged in war with the Indians on the
American continent." 8 Niles Weekly Register, March 18, 1815, pp. 35-36.
35 2 Training Regulations No. 15-70, U. S. Army, par. 24. Cf. "In sieges
and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes.
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes."
(Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. Army, 1914, pp. 69-70; Hague
Convention IV., 1907, art. 27.)
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getting better and better, we hear it said. World peace projects,
leagues to abolish war, and the like spread their doctrines through
the public press and out of the Christian pulpits. Yet it is
actually true that warfare has swayed here and there, has been
sometimes restricted and sometimes vigorous as times changed.
The World War extended its effects more and more, and its
methods. It disturbed the life of the world. There have been
World Wars before this one, and limited wars too. Warfare has
changed back and forth from time to time.
"The warfare of the century preceding the French Revolution," says Mr. Belloc-and the pertinency of his remarks lies
not in the authority of his name so much as in the verity of his
facts so far as they apply to the years from 1713 to 1792-"attempted limited things in a limited manner; it did not attempt
any fundamental change in society; it was not overtly-since the
Thirty Years War at least-a struggle of ideas; it was conducted
on behalf of known and limited interests for known and limited
objects; and the instruments with which it was conducted were
instruments artificial and segregated from the general life of
nations . . . what have been called the 'professional' armies. 1 8

In 1785, it was even possible for the American people to conclude a treaty with Prussia which provided:
"All women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen, unarmed
and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages or places, and in general
all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and
benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective
employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor
shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor
their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy, into whose
power by the events of war they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such
armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.
And all merchant and trading vessels employed in exchanging the
products of different places, and thereby rendering the necessaries, conveniences and comforts of human life more easy to be
obtained, and 4 more general, shall be allowed to pass free and
15
unmolested.1

In conformity with ideas such as were enunciated in that treaty
we have the theory that war should affect only armed men. Yet,
in spite of its age, it is only a theory. It began in the mind of
idealists and philosophical theorists. It became useful propa153BeIloc, The French Revolution 153.

1-17 Moore, Digest, p. 461.
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ganda in the mouths of statesmen. And thus it has proceeded
down the pages of history:
In 1758, Vattel remarked:
"Aujourd'hui, la guerre se fait par les troupes reglies; le
peuple, les paysans, les bourgeois, ne s'en m~lent point, et pour
l'ordinaire, ils n'ont rien A craindre de fer de l'ennemi." 1'
In 1762, Rousseau declared:
"La guerre n'est point une rdlation d'homme A hoipme, mais
une relation d'Atat 6: .taf, dans laqiielle les particuliers ne sont
ennemies qu'accidentellement, non point comme hommes, ni mme
comme citoyens mais conme soldats."'1 6
In 1792, when the French Revolution was emphasizing the
rights of individuals as against those of the state, when the doctrines of Rousseau were influencing those Jacobins who embarked
upon the foreign war, France declared hostilities against Austria,
"not a war of nation against nation, but the just defense of a
free people against the unjust aggression of a king."'5 7
In 1793, the French Republic announced itself to be "at war
with the King of England and the Stadtholder of the United
Provinces." 58
In 1798 Napoleon issued at Alexandria a very adroit proclamation, declaring that he made war only against the military
governing class of the Mamelukes, 159 and General Montesquiou
had already, in 1792, said much the same thing to the people of
0
Savoy16
In 1804 Alexander of Russia declared:
"It is not upon France that we make war, but only upon a
government as tyrannical towards France as towards the rest of
61
Europe."'
5
15
Vattel, Droit des Gens, bk. iii, ch. viii, sec. 147.
15 GRousseau, Contrat Social, bk. i, ch. iv. This sentiment was repeated
by the Revolutionary jurist, Portalis, and-in 1806-by Talleyrand in a
letter57to the Emperor. Bray, L'Occupation Militaire, pp. 177-178.
1 Declaration of War, April 20, 1792; 4 Duvergier, Collection complete des lois, 118; Anderson, Constitutions and Documents, 104.
158 5 Duvergier, Collection complete des lois, 135; Anderson, Constituitions and Documents, 151. At least one of their enemies remarked that
"nevertheless they commenced by waging war against the people, for they
immediately laid an embargo on all British vessels, seized all British property in France, and in every way harrassed and imprisoned (British) subjects." Life of Lisle, p. 97.
1598 Cambridge Modern History 599; Guitry, L'Armee de Bonaparte
en Egypte,
1798-1799, p. 87.
16 °Cresson, The Holy Alliance 13.
16152 Archives Parlementaires, ser. i, p. 295; Wambaugh, Monograph
on Plebiscites 269.
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In 1812, when General Hull of the American Army proceeded
to invade Canada, he stated that his army brought neither danger
nor difficulty to the peaceable and unoffending inhabitants, whom
he came to "protect" not to "injure.'

'1 2

In 1839, Rivera of Uruguay issued a proclamation declaring
war upon the tyrant Rosas, but not upon the peopleof Argentine.

163

In 1847, General Scott proclaimed at Vera Cruz to the Mexicans:
"Americans are not your enemies, but the enemies, for a
time, of the men who, a year ago, misgoverned you, and brought
about this unnatural war between two great republics. We are
friends of the peaceful inhabitants of the country we occupy.''
In 1863, General Robert E. Lee announced from the headquarters of the Army of Northern Virginia: "We make war
only on armed men."' 165
In 1865, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentine concluded a treaty
of alliance to make "war not against the people of Paraguay but
against the government,'

6

'

and proceeded to the practical annihi-

lation of the population.
In 1868, the Declaration of St. Petersburg determined that
"the only legitimate object which states should set before themselves during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy."

67

In 1870, King William of Prussia publicly said: "I wage
war on the soldiers not on the citizens of France."' 1 8
In 1895, during the Chino-Japanese War, Marshal Yagamata
stated in orders: "The enemy army contains our enemies. As
for the others, except those who harm or attempt to harm our
army, they ought not to be considered as our enemies." And
Marshal Oyama called war "an affair concerned with the relations of state to state, which does not touch the people."' 09
162 British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812. Champlain Society Publications,
No. XIII, pp. 355-356.
' 63
Robertson, History of the Latin-American Nations 259.
64
1 Smith. Military Government 105.
162 G. 0. 73, Army of No. Va., June 27, 1863; Connor, Belligerent Occupations, p. 55.
16655
British and Foreign State Papers, p. 83, art. 7.
67
1 Cited in Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. Army, 1914, p. 57.
6
' SProclamation, August 11, 1870; Bray, L'Occupation Militaire, pp.
179-180; Birkhimer, Military Government, 1st ed.. p. 76.
169 Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, pp. 40, 42.
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In 1898, President McKinley's instructions to American coinmanders in the field, which were reiterated in military proclamations, contained the following words:
"We come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines."7o
"We come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba." '
In 1900, entering the lands of the South African Republic,
Gen. Buller said: "Her Majesty does not make war upon individuals. . . . The quarrel England has is with the government,
7 2
not with the people, of Transvaal.'

Finally, we have the well-known pronouncement of President Wilson: "We have no quarrel with the German people" '
contained in his message to Congress of April 2, 1917, asking for
a declaration of war on account of the misdeeds committed by
"the Imperial German Government" against "the government
and people of the United States"-a sentiment reflected in his
letter of August 17, 1917, to the Pope wherein he said our
enemies were "not the German people" but "the vast military
establishment controlled by an irresponsible government,"'" 4 and
probably also reflected by the formal Congressional resolution
announcing war between "the United States" and "'the Imperial
German Government."'"
This is the record. How far are these true statements of
fact, and how far merely war-time propaganda? It is true that
in deciding a case in 1917, a court of law followed the sentiments
of the presidential pronouncement and declared:
"The president has very carefully distinguished between the
German government and the German people, and the sins of
that government ought not to be visited upon the people except
so far as the legitimate interests of the United States require."'7 8
Yet this was dictum, and not essential to the decision, although in
conformity with it. Suppose, though, it had been essential to
the decision. Will courts accept as a binding determination by
1T°Sen. Doc. 173, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 473 (May 19, 1898).
171Sen. Doe. 173, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 476 (July 13, 1898).
1722 Oppenheim, International Law, 2nd ed., p. 65.
173House Doc. No. 1, 65th Cong. 1st Sess.; Scott, Wilson's Foreign
Policy 275; Robinson & West, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson 388;

Wilson,
In Our First Year of War 18.
7 4

1 Scott, Wilson's Foreign Policy, pp. 322-323; Robinson & West, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson 409; Wilson, In Our First Year of War,
pp. 84-85; 6 Current Uistory 392; New York Times, August 29, 1917.
17540
76

Stat. at L. 1650-52.

1 Posselt v. d'Espard, (1917) 87 N. J. Eq. 571, 100 At]. 893.
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the political department of the government, statements made by
supreme executive officers in public addresses or in messages to
their legislative departments? Probably not at all, because they
have not been announced as law, and are primarily propaganda
anyway. They have not the force of Congressional enactments
or presidential proclanmations formally made. They are not official in the legal sense of the word.1 7 ' They are supplanted as
evidence of the national intent by the regular enactments of the
legislative branch. And they are furthermore in direct conflict
with accepted principles of law regarding the status of one belligerent toward another.
The courts speak in quite an opposite tenor from the statesmen. Concerning the right of a country to employ force in war,
it has been said:
"Either belligerent may modify or limit its operation as to
persons or territory of the other; but in the absence of such modification or restriction, judicial tribunals cannot discriminate in its
application."'-- 8
It has also been stated that British subjects adhering to the British government during the war of American independence, "became pcrsonally answerable for the conduct of that government
of which they remained a part."'"
And further:
"Vhen one nation is at war with another nation, all the subjects or citizens of the one are deemed in hostility to the subjects
or citizens of the other; they are personally at war with each
other."so
"Var makes the citizens or subjects of one belligerent enemies of the government, citizens and subjects of the other ...
During the war with Spain, Cuba was enemy's country, and all
persons residing there pending the war, whether Spanish subjects
or Americans, were to be deemed enemies of the United States."9'1
"War is not war between sovereigns or governments alone.
It puts each subject of the one belligerent into the position of
177A field commander's words to this effect are held as a valid promise. Planter's Bank v. Union Bank, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 483, 21 L.
Ed. 473, Ochoa v. Hernandez, (1913) 230 U. S. 139, 57 L. Ed. 1427, 33
Sup. 78
Ct. 1033.
1 The Venice, (1865) 2 Wall. (U.S.) 258, 274, 17 L. Ed. 866.
"'Ware v. Hylton, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 225, 1 L. Ed. 568. It
is to be noted that "Rousseau's doctrine has never been fully accepted by
British and American writers, and the history of all modern wars affords
overwhelming evidence of its falsity." Higgins, War and the Private
Citizen
12.
'18 (Vhite v. Burnley. (1857) 20 How. (U.S.) 235. 249, 15 L. Ed. 886.
lSlHerrera v. United States, (1912) 222 U. S. 558. 56 L. Ed. 316, 32
Sup. Ct. 179.
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being the legal enemy of each subject of the other belligerent.""'
This is the law. Even if general practice prior to the World War
was contrary thereto, which it was not-if we look back through
the centuries instead of merely through a few decades-we find
that all through history emphasis has been laid on the distinction
between the combatant and non-combatant portions of belligerent states. 183 .Itis doubtful if now the distinction has not begun
to vanish. Practice and precept have come down the ages with
varying applications according to the more or less general scope
or greater or less intensity of particular crises in war.
There are three reasons for believing that the distinction has
been vanishing: (1) the economic character of modern war,
(2) the prevalence of the conscription system, and (3) the character of modem governments and national policies. These must
be inspected in some detail.
XI. AN "EcoxoMIc WAR"
First comes the question of the economic character of modem war. A remark of von Moltke has often been cited as an
extremist's opinion, one held only by ultra-militaristic military
men. He declared:
"I can by no means profess agreement with the Declaration
of St. Petersburg when it asserts the weakening of the military
forces of the enemy is the only lawful procedure in war. No;
you must attack all the resources of the enemy's governmentits finances, its railways, its stores, and even its prestige." 8'
Still, this is not a distinctly military view, nor is it the view of a
single military man of a single nation. A high British court has
said that "the means to be employed include . . . the damage,
destruction, and appropriation of property, and injury to the
general resources of the country,.'185 The Supreme Court of the
United States has remarked:
"The right of one nation not only to coerce the other by direct
force, but also to cripple his resources by the seizure or destruction of his property, is a necessary result of a state of war.
Money and wealth, the products of agriculture and commerce, are
said to be the sinews of war, and as necessary in its conduct as
numbers and physical force." 186
182

Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre Co. [1916] A. C. 307, 308, 328.

'"Higgins,
War and the Private Citizen 13.
4

"S Letter to Bluntschli, December 11, 1880, cited in Holland, War on

Land 12; Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. Army, 1914, p. 14, par. 10.
'8 3 The Flad Oyen, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 135.
18 6The Prize Cases, (1862) 2 Black (U.S.) 635, 17 L. Ed. 459.
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When the American Civil War was in progress, it was not too
much to say that "the life of the Confederacy depended as much
upon its cotton as it did upon its men. . . .It was the foundation
upon which the hopes of the rebellion were built."' 8 7 It was
"potentially an auxiliary of the enemy by which they would be
able to secure warlike supplies abroad."' 18
"Victory is not won by army or navy alone," says Spenser
Wilkinson, "it must be the work of the whole hation. ' 18DAnd the
way in which the World War was fought by the principal belligerents and in which future great wars will probably be fought,
has perhaps never been so well described as by President Wilson
in his message of April 15, 1917 to his fellow countrymen, in
which he said:
"Our industries, on the farm, in the shipyards, in the mines,
in the factories, must be made more prolific and efficient than
ever. They must be more economically managed and better
adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have
been. . . .The men and women who devote their thought and
their energy to these things will be serving their country and
conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as effectively as
the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial
forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great
national Service Army-a notable and honored host engaged in
the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and
saviours of free men everywhere. Thousands, nay, hundreds
of thousands, of men otherwise liable to military service will of
right and of necessity be excused from that service and assigned
to the fundamental, sustaining work of the fields and factories
and mines, and they will be as much a part of the great patriotic
forces of the nation as the men tinder fire."''0
Strange indeed it seems, therefore, to find a legal mind referring
to the contrary statement of the same president, and saying that
the German government and German people were separate, and
that the German people should not be affected "except so far as
Is-Lamar v. Browne, (1875) 92 U. S.187, 23 L. Ed. 650.
l8sYoung v. United States, (1877) 97 U. S. 39. 59. 24 L. Ed. 992.
This appears to be the real essence of this often misquoted and frequently

misunderstood case. See also: Mrs. Alexander's Cotton. (1864) 2 Wall.
(U. S.) 404; United States v. Padelford. (1869) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 531:
Sprott v. United States, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 459; Haycraft v. United
States. (1874) 22 Wall. (U.S.) 81, 22 L. Ed. 738.
'5 9 Wilkinson, Government and the ,Var. pp. 229-230.
I'-0 Scott. Wilson's Foreign Policy 288: Robinson and West, Foreign
Policy of Woodrow Wilson, pp. 394-395; Wilson, In Our First Year of

War 34.
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'
In
the legitimate interests of the United States require.""
other words, the government and people of the United States
were to be presumed at war with the supposedly isolated German
government. All of our population was asked to take part in a
war to be waged, however, not upon the enemy population but
upon the politicians alone. And yet the Germans were organized
for the combat the same way as the Americans. The nations of
the world were all organized the same way too. A French publicist has recently remarked, with much sense and good discrimination:
"Munition workers, men and women . ..occupy a position
intermediate between the combatants properly so called and the
non-combatants who continue to follow their peacetime pursuits
and professions. The reasons for giving them a privileged position in regard to hostile action are losing much of their force.
Fundamentally these people are in almost exactly the same situation as men engaged in the auxiliary services of the army. Now
the latter are certainly exposed to violent measures."'9 2
It is interesting, at this point to note two post-bellum pronouncements on this topic. The first is from an editorial in the
American Legion Weekly, a popular periodical written by and
read by veterans of the World War:
"The soldier on his belly on a field of fire, the workman at
executive at his desk in an officehis bench in a factory, the
193
alike they serve the flag."'
The second is from a speech by the assistant secretary of war of
the United States, who refers to the probability of the bombing of
important seaports, industrial centers, and foci of communications, and says:
"If there should ever be another war, we must realize that it
is not only the Army and the Navy which may be on the firing
lines. We must realize that there may be no non-combatants."'9 4
This is the character of fighting which an economic contest
may bring upon us. The World War may be an example for

191Posselt v. d'Espard, (1917) 87 N. J. Eq. 571, 100 Atd. 893; See
also the opinion of Cardoso, J. in Techt v. Hughes, (1920) 229 N. Y.
222, 128 N. E. 185, making a similar distinction.
192 1 Rolland, Le Droit des Gens et la Guerre de 1914-1918, pp. 646647, cited in Spaight. "Air Bombardments" in British Year Book of
Law, 1923-1924, p. 32.
International
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American Legion Weekly, June 8, 1923, p. 8.
1 Dwight F. Davis. Speech at St. Louis, Mo., October 1, 1923. War
Department press release. The French army bill is based on the idea
that "modern war extends to every branch of national life." (San
Francisco Examiner, March 16, 1924.)
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future wars. Then, as far as defensive purposes were concerned,
it was the fashion to plead righteously for the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants, speaking in vague and general
terms of "violated international law" whenever an allied citizen
was wounded or killed, without inquiring whether or not he was
a munitions worker or a railway employee. But, for offensive
purposes, our civilian population was itself organized like an
army. Warring nations on both sides spared no effort to
increase their own economic resources by using every available
worker in the "essential industries" or to cripple the economic
resources of the enemy, irrespective of any supposed immunities
to non-combatants. The economic needs of a nation at war and
of armies in the field, in these complicated civilized times, are
such that warfare is largely maintained by economic means.
Industry of course cannot win a war, but it can lose a war by
failing to provide the necessary materials, bullets and shells for
the rifles and guns, foods and clothes for the men who direct
them, and means of transporting them and of keeping up that
constant communication upon which the strategic and tactical
co6peration of forces in the field depends. The necessity of
industry and of economic resources in war is well demonstrated
b.y the World War, from which but a few instances will need to
be drawn. For example, in 1914, when the Germans invaded
Poland it was reported that the advancing armies took with them
great numbers of threshing machines, reaped the crops, and sent
them off to the home centers of supply."9 5 In England, a War
Agricultural Committee in each county had in 1917 compulsory
powers of directing the cultivation of grass land; 1 1 industries
for the making of dyes and optical glass "proved essential to the
nation ; '1197 and over 4,000 independent firms employed nearly
2.500,000 people producing munitions of war under state control
198
as "controlled establishments."'
Some persons may be called "peaceful" and some "armed"
citizens of a belligerent nation, some may be called "combatant"
and some "non-combatant" but it is hard to maintain very strictly
in view of the actual facts, that the "peaceful" and "non-combat195The Times (London), September 24, 1914, p. 6; Phillipson, International
Law and the Great War, pp. 227-228.
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' Whetham, The War and the Nation 71.
197Ibid., p. 127.
19sIbid., p. 145.
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ant" persons who assist in the prosecution of the war shall not
be disturbed in the work which he does for the specific purpose
of aiding the army. For example, in Japan since 1888 the government factory for the manufacture of military woolen cloth
has been administered by the war department. In recent years
the factory has left to private manufacture a part of the military woolen cloth needed by the army, and also ordinary woolen
cloth which had been manufactured by the government factory as
subsidiary work. 199 What had been a purely war department
activity became, with the growth of civil industry, also a civil
activity, and part of it for military purposes. Of the instruments
and materials necessary for military communications, about onethird are made in Japanese military arsenals and the rest are
made by private manufacturers.200 Horseshoes for use in ordinary times that could not be made on the spot by the troops requiring them, and all horseshoes for use in time of mobilization for
war, are intended to be made at the gun accessories factory in
the Tokyo arsenal, but when necessary a part of the work is
given to private farriers by contract.20' 1 Can the same clothmaking-all military men would appreciate the need of supplying
proper uniformsin time of war--can the same cloth-making which
is conducted in a government factory be interfered with by aerial
bombing and not that in private factories? Can the Japanese
arsenal making binoculars be bombed, and not the Eastman
Kodak works at Rochester, New York? Can a government storehouse full of field wife be bombed, and not those stocks of
"twisted pair" owned by the Bell Telephone System?20 - What
difference does it make where the article may be that is of military use to the soldiers, whether in a military supply base or in
a private factory? On the one hand we have a collection of
jurists at the Hague "agreed that it was desirable that the laws
of war should be such as to prevent suffering of persons or
destruction of property, except such as was inevitable for the
accomplishment of the military objective. 203 And on the other
hand we have a Japanese writer remarking:
199Kobayashi, Military Industries of Japan 105.
20Ibid., p. 90.
201

Ibid., p. 99.
2Crowell, America's Munitions 575.
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Rodgers, Laws of War Concerning Aviation and Radio, in 17 Am.
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J. int. L. 632.
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"The industry of the army and the general industries of the
nation cannot be completely separated when the needs in time of
war and in the development of the general industry are taken
into consideration. On the contrary, they are ever approaching
nearer and nearer to each other as the civilization of the world
advances." '0
with an able British writer adding a statement which announces
"the appropriation to the purposes of war of the results of
mechanical invention and the industrial revolution."205 The remarks have been made in connection with the military problems
of production and of procurement and of supply. Do the truths
they set forth apply equally well as regards the policy to be
adopted by an attacking enemy, whether that enemy come through
the air, or over the ocean, or across the intervening spaces of
land, like the raiding cavalrymen of Mosby, and Morgan, and
Forrest?
*Ve are told concerning the last war that:
"As an obstacle to economic life the almost continuous
bombardment of the mine districts of the Saare Valley, the irondistrict of Conflans-Briey-Longwy, Josuf, and the Rhine Valley,
admittedly greatly weakened Germany's power of resistance. 2 0
\Ve are advised for the future that:
"The destructive action of bombing aviation extends as far
as industrial centers and manufacturing plants which are grouped
in the zone of the interior. It is there that the arms of war are
manufactured, and sul)plies of all sorts prepared, which enable
the armies to fight and to exist. To strike at such works is to
hit the source itself of the current which nourishes the combative
forces of the enemy. 20 7
\Ve are told concerning the last war that:
"Besides material destruction, the long-distance clay raids of
the Independent Air Force [Cologne, Coblenz, Mannheim, etc.]
caused great injury to morale, disruption of traffic or labor, and
diverted a large amount of anti-aircraft
defense and air squad20 8
rons from the field of battle.

1

,Ve are advised for the future that:
"A bombardment of factories has for its object the destruction
of certain parts of the factories, the disorganization of the crowds
of workers by the losses suffered, the stoppage of work during
the time of alarm, and demoralization of workers who refuse to
24Kobayashi, Military Industries of Japan 180.
20oWilkinson, Government and the War 66.
2;OAerial Bombardment Manual, U. S. Army (1920), Part 1, p. 8.
0
2 7.Ibid., (1920),
Part 3. p. 22.
-°SIbid., (1920), Part 1. p. 9.
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work in a zone subjected to frequent attacks. The last results
are perhaps the most inportant."209
After surveying these extracts, perhaps after all we may be
constrained to accept a change in fact, whether or not there has
been a change in law. We must at any rate seriously consider
the position taken by the British Foreign Office which announced
when altering the contraband list:
"So large a proportion of the inhabitants of the enemy country are taking part, directly or indirectly, in the war that no real
be
drawn between the armed forces and the
distinction can now 21
0
civilian population.
More recently it has been said, by an American lawyer:
"In the Great \Var . . . whole populations had such a direct
relation to the contest that a line between combatants and noncombatants could not logically be drawn."- 1
And the most extreme statement of what the situation may be
is this:
"In the course of the Great War several conditions developed
which will materially modify the law of war. In the first place,
much of the old law as to the relations between belligerent states
is based upon the assumption that war is in essence a conflict
between their fighting forces and not between their populations.
Whether or not that condition ever in fact existed, it no longer
obtains. Prior to the Great War, all the resources of Gernanymilitary, industrial, and financial-had been organized for war.
Under such an organization a peasant woman cultivating a farm
was as much a part of the military machine as was a soldier in
the ranks, and from a military standpoint there was no reason for
placing the two in different categories. In the course of the Great
War, the adversaries of Germany were forced to adopt a similar
type of organization and in any future war of magnitude. the
resources of the belligerents will be mobilized on the same principle but with even greater care and effectiveness." 21- It is ver " difficult to say whether such an extreme view as this
warrants belief. It is very hard to think that wars will mean
national.extermination, or attempts at such. It is also hard to
draw the line. for the future as wcll as for the past. Regulations will persist, because there will at least be some semblance
of military object and objective whenever non-combatants suffer.
But those who attempt to adhere to the ancient and now inapplic20

Ibid.. (1920), Part 3, p. 29.
2102 Garner, International Law and the World War 287. Cf. also
The 2Kim, [19151 P. 215.
1Evans, Leading Cases in International Law, 2nd ed., p. 681, note.
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able distinctions which might have been perfectly valid two hundred years ago in the days of purely professional armies, should
realize that the war plans of the nations today do not contemplate
purely professional armies, or even contemplate all war effort by
armies. In a statement concerning plans and projects for industrial mobilization in time of conflict the American assistant secretary of war said in 1923:
"Wars are no longer fought by the armed forces alone. Every
man, woman, and child, every resource and every dollar in the
entire213nation must throw its weight toward victory in time of
war."
And his predecessor in the same office said
"If war should be forced upon us, we will find that our
individual and collective effort is unified, and that all America is
consecrated, materially and spiritually, body and soul, to national
213
defense." b

This is the situation which confronts us today. This is the
principle which will be applied in economic wars of the future.
This is the principle which governs the following imaginary warfare in the future penned by an able military man who often
thinks very acutely and soundly on all phases of war. He says:
"A few years ago armies alone went forth to battle; today
entire nations go to war, not only as soldiers, but as moral and
material suppliers of soldiers. This being so, we find that, while
a short time back it was clearly possible to differentiate between
the military and the ethical objective of nations at war, today
this difference is becoming more and more complex; so much so
that both these objectives are likely to coincide, and when this
takes place, to attack the civilian workers
of a nation will then
'214
be as justifiable as to attack its soldiers.
This is, again, the principle involved in the analysis made by a
German who, for his liberal opinions is persona non grata in his
own country. He says:
"In the present age of commerce, in which millions of people
live scattered about in foreign lands or move from place to
place, it is impossible still to regard war as a matter which concerns only the military persons of the participating states. ...
Not alone in the belligerent countries, but even in the neutral
world, there is really no one who is not in some way or other
21
3Dwight F. Davis, speech at Chicago, Ill., October 5, 1923, War
Department press release.
21"bJ. Mayhew Wainwright, speech at Buck Hill Falls, Pa., October
25, 1922, War Department press release.
214Fuller, The Reformation of War 70.

LAWS OF AERIAL WARFARE

affected by a great war. The mutual connections between individuals in all walks of life are today so ramified and complicated
that no one can entirely escape the effects of such a war. He
who is not affected as a military person or as one who must enter
into this war with body and soul will nevertheless be affected by
the war in his family life, or his economic condition, or his social,
spiritual and moral relations. The attempts to curb or eliminate
such effects have proved to be impotent. No one escapes these
effects. It is therefore an empty theory that war is an affair of
states, and that the carrying on of war concerns only military
persons. In the age of commerce war is an affair of peoples
15
who conduct it with all their physical and economic strength.'"
So, in attempting to discuss war, or any of its phases or means
of regulating it, we must have the facts and the theories bear some
relation. The theories must be founded on the facts, as the doctrines of every international principle grow from facts. War is
economic at times, economic in cause, and economic in nature.
A recent writer has with great detail sustained the thesis of its
almost unvarying economic cause saying that "economic conditions have stimulated war in all ages" and citing Mr. H. N.
Brailsford with approval and supporting fact in the argument
that "the potent pressure of economic expansion. is the motive
force in an international struggle."21 6 Since war is economic, it
affects all persons and loses many, if not most, of the ancient
distinctions. For instance, before the American entrance into
the World War, the British-as an incident to postal censorship
-took from the mails money orders, checks, and bills of exchange
payable to Germans in Germany. Cargoes of grain and flour consigned to individuals in Germany were seized by the British who
quite ignored the old standards as to "contraband" and "conditional contraband." It was argued that since, on January 25,
1915, the Germans had confiscated all foodstuffs in their empire
and adopted the system of "rationing," any food stuffs crossing
the frontier would go inevitably to the German government and
possibly to the Germany army, even though consigned and
'
eventually delivered to private individuals.217
The Allies then
formed their famous "iron ring" around their enemies and deliberately planned to starve a whole nation, acting upon the same
theory as that set forth in the Lieber Instructions of 1863: that
2

'SNippold, Development of International Law after the World War,

tr. A.
218S. Hershey, p. 114.

Bakeless. Economic Causes of Modem War 10.
1 Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War, pp. 59-64.
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"war is 'not carried on by arms alone," and that "it is lawful to
starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads
to the speedier subjection of the enemy.

2 18

As early as Novem-

ber, 1914, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
remarked that economic pressure-it is said that he invented the
phrase-brought about by the naval blockade, would ultimately
spell the doom of Germany as certain as the winter struck the
leaves from the trees. 211 It was deemed proper to starve the noncombatants of the enemy, because the diminution of food for all
would lessen the amount df food that might be forwarded to the
enemy army which, like all armies, moved "on its stomach." It
was deemed proper to attack any element of the enemy country
which assisted the enemy in prosecuting the war. The food crop,
the mine, the forest, the factory, the transportation center, the
administrative office-all places where work went on that would
eventually be of support and aid to the soldiers at the front-all
were deemed properly subject to attack however far from the
battlefield.2 0 Nor, when we think of the size of modern armies,
the difficulties of maintaining them, and the needs of present-day
combat, is it fantastic to speak thus of attacks upon these things
as military measures against enemy military resources and objectives. It connection with an extended discussion of Martial Law
aroused in England by the Marais case of 1902, a distinguished
English legal writer remarked:
"There may be a state of war at any given place where aid
and comfort can be effectually given to the enemy having regard
to the22modern conditions of warfare and means of communication." 1

We must simply face the fact. We wage war ourselves from
every corner of the country. We should not too petulantly object
if an enemy sends night bombardment units deep into our territory on strategical-as opposed to tactical in the military senseoperations which will affect our combat troops only remotely,
especially since our own manuals recommend the same measures
to our own flyers. 22 The battlefield is wider than it has been.
2 8

1 Lieber Instructions, G. 0. 100, A. G. 0., 1863, art. 17; Rules of
Land229Warfare, U. S. Army, 1914, p. 56, par. 173, note.
Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War 143.
220
"Raids are made at great distances." (Aerial Bombardment Manual, 221
U. S. Army (1920), Part 1, p. 6.)
Pollock, What is Martial Law? in 18 L. Q. Rev. 152, 157.
222
Training Regulations No. 15-70, U. S. Army (1922), pars. 15-16.
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Modern industrial, economic, and social organization and administration has brought our civilian population into the war. Modem inventions and appliances have enabled both ourselves and
the enemy to pass through the air and attack these "civilian soldiers" as they should be called. When an economic war comes,
that is what we may expect.

XII. "SELECrIvE SERVICE"
The second reason for believing that the distinction betveen
combatant and non-combatant has vanished is the prevalence and
character of the modern conscription system. In other days the
"press gang" used to take the able-bodied men it needed. Now,
the draft law takes the able-bodied fit to fight only when they are
not needed in some one of the "essential industries" without
which the war cannot be prosecuted, and recognizes in what
President Wilson said would amount to "thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands" of instances, the essential aid certain kinds
of workers can give the country by remaining at their pristine
tasks.
The distinction between combatant and non-combatant has
already been clearly considered as non-existent in guerilla campaigning 'where a whole population engages in warfare. 2"3 We
have already seen how three South American nations combining
against Paraguay professed to attack the government and not the
people,224 and yet when the whole people became a part of the
Paraguayan army, and even women were used to carry military
burdens, the war extended to almost every individual until almost
the entire nation was obliterated..2 2 5 What happened in a few
years in South America has been happening gradually all over the
face of the world. "Since the French Revolution, the dominant
type of European army has been the nation in arms." -" The
Grand Monarch may have said: "L'Etat c'est moi !" but the citizens of republican France, every one of whom was required to
fight, declared with patriotic fervor: "L'Etat c'est nous !" The
truth of the matter was well summed up by von Moltke when he
wrote: "The wars of the present day call the whole peoples to
arms; hardly a family which is not included.1 227 And an eminent
22

3Bordwell, Laws of War 152.

55 British and Foreign State Papers, p. 83, Treaty of May 1, 1865.
5Thompson, War in Paraguay 342.
2261 Taylor, Wars of Marlborough 18.
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British writer and teacher on military subjects has cited with
approval the remark of Clausewitz:
"Since Bonaparte, war, by becoming, first on one side then
on the other, an
affair of the whole people, has acquired a differ22' 8
ent character.
Every man does his part in the war, advancing under barrages
overseas, doing military police work or supply administration
along the line of communications, winning and wearing silver
chevrons at home, buying Liberty Bonds, boosting production,
taking unaccustomed tasks so as to release another, abler person
for the front, tilling a little garden plot, working on a lathe in a
munitions factory, holding down a "dollar--a-day" post at the
capital or on a draft board-yes, even sewing that little strip of
sky-blue ribbon on the overseas cap. It is particularly worth
mentioning that "anti-aircraft defense presumes cobperation of
civilians in darkening areas, in issuing warnings, and in complying with them." 229 Nowadays we are all in it, whether making
shells or firing them from a field piece, whether writing propaganda leaflets or dropping them behind the enemy lines. Each
man, and each woman, too, has a part to play, as President Wilson indicated in his message to the American people already
quoted. Conscription is not merely the work of a "press gang"
as in the Eighteenth Century, picking up a few stray men for
small armies. Conscription is a nation-wide affair. It is called
"Selective Service" because it selects this man to carry a rifle
over the top, that man to build a ship, and the next man to cut
spruce wood for airplanes from the forests of the state of Washington. It recognizes that modern war is an industrial war and
that industries must do their part. Such may very probably be
the next war. The boast has recently been made that now the
British Empire "acts as one force in peace as well as in war"
with "industries well organized imperially".23 0 Industries depend
upon manpower the same as armies do. Reduce the active industrial manpower, and you reduce the force with which the war is
waged. Reduce the human forces behind the war, and you work
toward your war aims as effectively as when you reduce the
human force that marches in khaki columns and leaps forward
with thrusting bayonet.
28Ibid., p. 77.
0Manual of Anti-Aircraft
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In a very extreme statement, neither sound nor judged to be
so by the court, one of the defense counsel at Leipzig in the case
of the Llandovery Castle-in the face of international conventions protecting wounded persons and hospital personnel-argued
that "it was necessary to destroy the men and women in the
life-boats in order to prevent them from reaching their homes
and rejoining the war." 231 The statement was extreme, too extreme; yet there was some truth in the idea behind it. It is too
much to assert that every man, woman, or child in any nation
might be killed ;232 but it is not too much to assert that every
man, woman, and child who works for the direct aid and supply
of troops at the front--except those protected by the Geneva
conventions-has no just cause of complaint if a hostile airplane
flies overhead and -hurts the individual in the course of an aerial
raid aimed at preventing or hampering the war work. The
methods and motives of the selective service laws are too well
known to need further elaboration, except to call attention to
the fact that the title is truly descriptive, and not merely a convenient and tactful substitute for the word "draft." The result
of the selective service method and idea and of its thoroughgoing application is to break down to a great extent the old distinction between combatant and non-combatant.
XIII. PoPULAR NATIONALISM
The third reason for believing that the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants has broken down, in addition to
the economic character of modem war and the purpose and manner of modem conscription lies in the nature of modern governments and national policies. The absolute monarchs went to war
to enrich themselves.23 The nations of the present go to war in
support of national economic policies which are to the advantage
of their citizens. The citizens are interested in the war, and also
interested in the government, as never before. They have a
direct hand in the moulding of governmental policies, through
the ballot box, the legislative lobby, political influence, and the
public press. Under the present conditions of national psychology and nation-wide publicity, a war becomes "a popular move2
3'Mullins,
232

The Leipzig Trials 127.
Evans, Leading Cases in International Law, 2nd ed., pp. 723-724,
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ment" 234 and "a social effort ' 2 3 5 whose motives vibrate "in the

spirit of every member of the community," each of whom is
"deeply stirred by the cause of the quarrel.

' 230

To an acute

thinker this fact was evident during the World War. He remarked: "It has been said that we have no quarrel with the
German people, but only with the Emperor and the military
caste," and added that time had shown the German people to be
"heart ,and soul in the war along with the Emperor and the military caste.

' 237

Under such circumstances we must admit the

truth of Sherman's statement, as an Englishman admitted it in
1912,238 that "the proper strategy consists in the first place in
inflicting as telling blows as possible on the enemy's army, and
then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must
long for peace and force their governors to demand it." It is a
truth demonstrated by American armies in 1846-1848 when
Scott's lenient attitude in Mexico was abandoned for measures more severe adopted avowedly for this purpose. 23

And a

modern historian has said that Sherman's own march to the sea
during the American Civil War "destroyed food and confidence"
and had a decided effect in weakening both the morale and the
249
numerical strength of Lee's superb fighting machine.
Thus we find in war the use of what is known as "moral pressure" far more effective now than in the days of undemocratic
and non-representative governments. It has in the past been
the practice to exert this pressure by deliberately firing shells
into the obviously residential sections of besieged towns, to terrorize them and move them to compel the military authorities to
capitulate. 241

Theorists have declared that such bombardments

cannot be excused and can only be accounted for as survivals of
old practice, and yet we have to admit that they are for the present "sanctioned by usage.

' 242

Similarly, one of the purposes of

invading enemy territory, apart from winning victories over an
adversary's troops, is to make the invader's superiority felt by
the whole population of the enemy state. It has been pointed out
234Wilkinson,
Government and the War 66.
235
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that France was not vanquished when Metz and Sedan had capitulated. Paris had to be starved into a surrender and the whole
nation reduced and paralyzed .43 Again, during the revolutionary
conflicts in South America, Bolivar felt that the Venezuelans had
not made the war sufficiently felt by the royalist population to
insure him the peace he desired, so he issued the following manifesto to the inhabitants of New Granada, December 15, 1812:
"The codes consulted by our magistrates were not those in
which they might learn the practical science of government; but
those invented by visionaries who, imagining chimerical republics, have thought it possible to attain political perfection, assuming the perfectibility of the human race. Thus it is that we
have had philosophers in place of chiefs, philanthropy in place
of legislation,24 dialectics in place of tactics, and sophists in place
of soldiers."

4

During General Scott's occupation of Mexic6 in 1846, he promiised immunity to persons and property and paid for what he
took, until it was thought that Mexico was continuing the war
because the civil population was not feeling its hardship. "Consequently instructions ordered him to support his army by uncompensated seizures. 2 45 We should note the statement of von
Moltke to the effect that "the factors which militate against
peace, are to be found in the peoples themselves. 1" 2 4

Or, to quote

an American rather than a German, we may point to Admiral
Malian remarking that the destruction of the enemy's armed
forces alone will not bring a war to a conclusion for there is
also needed "pressure on the population to produce stagnation
of the national life.

-47

Also to be noted is the passage in the

Lieber Instructions:
"Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign
nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civil existence that men live in political, continuous societies, forming
organized units called states or nations, whose constituents bear.
enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and
in.war. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an
enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state
or nation,
'2
and as such is subjected to the hardships of war." "
2 3
4 Higgins,
2

War and the Private Citizen, pp. 49-50, 68.
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245 7 Moore Digest, pp. 282-285; Wright, Enforcement of International
Law 246
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The states of the world are now nationalistic. They are permeated with the patriotic spirit. The individual members thereo.f
think together and act together in warlike operations. The man
in the wealthy club on Fifth Avenue has often been accused of
starting the wars of the past for the advantage of his own financial or commercial interests, and accused of being less capable
of shouting about "licking the rascals" if he might himself feel
the weight of the enemy power on his family or on his own person. Yet he is only a part of the nationalized state that is waging
the war, a nationalized state that has called out and organized
every form of resource for the purposes of war.2 40 If his opinion could be modified or his earnest exhortations suppressed, the
enemy might be more successful. When the Germans raided
London, it was said that they "seldom effected damage of importance." 250 Yet it has been stated that although they "did not
succeed in dropping bombs with any marked degree of accuracy,
. . . they nevertheless had their value. 2 11 It has been claimed
252
that the Zeppelin raids "did much for recruiting in Britain.
Yet perhaps a more mature consideration of the facts and of
the cumulative effects of such raids extending continuously over
a long period of time, would lead to the conclusion that a defenseless, though not undefended, population would sooner or later
become war weary under successive bombardments, and become
skeptical of the glowing accounts their own leaders were giving
out as to their own reputed "command of the air." Slowly their
morale might be broken, particularly the morale of the working
population who labor in those factories most likely to be under
fire. And public sentiment and opinion make possible or impos2 53
sible battlefield achievements in war.
"War, completely seen, is no mere collision of physical forces:
it is a collision of will against will. It is, after all, the mind and
will of a nation-a thing intangible and invisible-that assembles
the materials of war, the fighting forces, the ordnance, the whole
physical array. It is this invisible thing that wages the war; it
is this same invisible thing that on one side or the other must
248
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admit the finish and so end it. As things are now, it is the element of 'morale' that controls the outcome." 2 5'
Intercourse with your enemy's people is forbidden in time of
war. The press is censored. Private letters have portions deleted. You may have command of the air at any given place or
places; but his communiques will seldom admit it. Your army
may be as fit as his; but his leaders will not let the fact be known
at home. Suppose, then, you use your aircraft to overleap his
lines. You may drop leaflets setting forth your version of
affairs. 25 5 Or you may make your arguments more tangible and
convincing than mere words on printed paper. Those might be
readily branded as lies. If, however, your aircraft go deep into
his territory, through his protecting squadrons, and drop explosives on military munitions plants in the neighborhood of his
population, before their very eyes, within hearing of their very
ears, the individual may realize that "command of the air" is not
so completely in the hands of his own forces as he has been led
to believe. You make each of your opponents understand that
you are still continuing the fight. Such an effect on enemy morale may be gained in addition to all material harm done his rearward military establishments, and industrial equipment, and
transportation centers. This effect on morale was clearly contemplated and utilized by all belligerents in the late war. Will
it be used in the future? The American and British instruction
books seem to so provide. One of the objects of night bombing
is said to be "to lower morale of both troops and civilians ... by
continually disturbing the security of troops, of headquarters, and
the native inhabitants."25- 6 One of the distinctive features of the
airplane is said to be its ability "to fly deep into enemy territory"
where "bombing operations are conducted in order to destroy the
enemy's morale, thereby reducing the efficiency and fighting
power of the enemy's military forces and the support furnished
by the civilian population. 2-57 It is not possible to separate
entirely the moral effect of bombing and its material effect. Every
raid may be of use for two things. Bombing may most effectively and most economically be used to attack railway junctions,
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"arsenals, dockyards, and factories which manufacture articles
necessary in warfare."2 " But this use has a double value. It
hurts the material effectiveness of military production and supply, and it also hurts the civilian operation of the agencies for
that production and supply. On the one hand, the army may be
deprived of tangible things required for its very existence at the
front. On the other hand, it may be deprived of that popular
support without which troops of today fight but ineffectively.
The material destruction is rather generally admitted as permissible. The destruction of morale, which commonly accompanies
it, is usually spoken of as an undesirable damage, collateral to
the main purpose and almost unavoidable in these "civilized
days" though, as a matter of fact this very destruction of morale
is an integral part of the aim and purpose of all war-time operations and underlies all carefully planned strategy.
(To be continued)
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